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A NEW CATEGORY OF FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS:
PROTECTION FOR INDIVIDUALS OBJECTING TO
GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS
THAT IMPEDE THEIR RELIGIONS
JAMIE ALAN COLEt
The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection
from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not
afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the
Government's internal procedures.
-Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2152 (1986).
[Tjhe Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the
government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of
what the individual can exact from the government.
-Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
The United States Constitution provides each individual with the
right to exercise freely her religion.1 There are three ways in which a
law could conflict with an individual's religious liberty. First, a law
could limit the ability of an individual to believe in her religion. Sec-
ond, a law could limit the ability of an individual to act in accordance
with her religion (or require her to act contrary to her religion). Third,
a law could result in governmental action that conflicts with an individ-
ual's religion.
The Supreme Court has established a different degree of protec-
tion for each of these types of situations. In the first situation, the Su-
- B.S., University of Pennsylvania, 1985; J.D. Candidate 1988, University of
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1 U.S. CONsT. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. "
(1557)
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preme Court has consistently held that the free exercise clause acts as
an absolute bar to laws that limit an individual's ability to believe in
her religion.2 In the second situation, the Court has ruled that the free
exercise clause is not an absolute bar;' rather, the Court has permitted
laws that limit an individual's actions, but only when the state interest
outweighs the individual's interest."
The third situation is the focus of this Comment. In Bowen v.
Roy,5 eight members of the Supreme Court ruled that the free exercise
2 See Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2152 (1986) ("Our cases have long recog-
nized a distinction between the freedom of individual belief, which is absolute, and the
freedom of individual conduct, which is not absolute."); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-
04 (1940) (The first amendment "embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and free-
dom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.").
See, e.g., Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2152.
' The specifics of the balancing test are, however, beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. This Comment deals with the preliminary question of when there should be free
exercise protection (i.e., when the balancing test should be applied); it does not deal
with the degree of protection that should be provided by the Court's balancing test. For
examples of applications of the balancing test, see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
257-58 (1982) (the regulation must be "essential to accomplish an overriding govern-
mental interest"); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
718 (1981) ("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is
the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest."); Yoder, 406
U.S. at 215 ("[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."); Sherbert, 374 U.S.
at 406 ("[N]o showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest
would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.'" (quoting
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945))). But see Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2156 ("Ab-
sent proof of an intent to discriminate against particular religious beliefs or against
religions in general, the Government meets its burdens when it demonstrates that a
challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its applica-
tion, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest.") This holding in
Roy would represent a major reduction in the burden required of the government to
justify this type of interference with religious liberty. This portion of the Chief Justice's
opinion, however, did not command a majority of the Court. Rather, five members of
the Court agreed that Sherbert and Thomas controlled the outcome of the issue. See id.
at 2168 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Subsequent cases have also rejected Chief Justice Burger's Roy standard. See Hob-
bie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046, 1049 (1987) (rejecting Chief
Justice Burger's standard in Roy); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 955 (5th Cir.
1986) (relying on Yoder and Lee despite "fragmentation of opinions" in Roy). But see
Leahy v. District of Columbia, 646 F. Supp. 1372, 1376-78 (D.D.C. 1986) (relying on
Roy in refusing to apply Yoder, Sherbert, and Thomas to a case where an individual
objected to a social security number requirement for drivers' licenses).
The degree of protection that should be given to an individual objecting to a law
that limits an individual's actions is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a general
examination of the balancing test as applied by the courts, see Giannella, Religious
Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381
(1967).
5 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
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clause does not give an individual the right to dictate governmental ac-
tions.' The effect of this ruling is to distinguish between a law that
requires an individual to act contrary to her religion (providing free
exercise protection), and one that results in an action by the govern-
ment that impedes an individual's religion but does not require or pre-
vent any action by the individual (providing no free exercise
protection).
Part I of this Comment will examine the distinction between indi-
vidual and governmental actions, evaluate the justifications underlying
this distinction, and conclude that the distinction is neither satisfactory
nor consistent with the general policies underlying the religion clauses.
Part II will apply the Roy distinction to past free exercise cases in four
different contexts and find that the distinction is inconsistent with the
holdings in these cases. The result is that Roy represents an unjustified
curtailment of free exercise protection, without providing adequate
guidance for courts to apply the decision. This in turn will permit
courts to avoid the harsh results of Roy merely by distinguishing a case
from it. Part III will propose that a third category of free exercise
claims should be recognized. Specifically, the courts should provide pro-
tection to individuals objecting to governmental actions that impede the
ability of the individual to choose or follow a specific religion, even
when no individual action is required or prevented.
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND GOVERNMENTAL
ACTION
A. Bowen v. Roy: No Free Exercise Right To Prevent
Governmental Action
In Bowen v. Roy,' an Abenaki Indian challenged the requirement
that all participants in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
and Food Stamp programs furnish their social security numbers and
allow the agency to use the numbers in the administration of each pro-
gram.' Specifically, Roy refused to obtain, furnish, or allow the use of a
social security number for his two-year-old daughter, Little Bird of the
Snow, because he believed that a unique numerical identifier would rob
6 Id. at 2152 (Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.), 2159 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part), 2161 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result),
2165 (O'Connor, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
7 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
8 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(25) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 42 U.S.C. 1320(b-7)(a)(1)
(Supp. III 1985); 7 U.S.C. 2025(e) (1982).
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her spirit.' As a result of Roy's refusal to comply with program re-
quirements, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare termi-
nated benefits for Little Bird of the Snow. Roy then filed an action
against the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Wel-
fare, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of
Agriculture, arguing that the free exercise clause entitled Little Bird of
the Snow to an exemption from the social security number
requirement.10
The scope of the inquiry changed markedly when a federal officer
testified that Little Bird of the Snow had already been assigned a social
security number.11 The government argued that the case was moot be-
cause, based on Roy's beliefs, Little Bird of the Snow's spirit had al-
ready been "robbed."1 The case, however, was revived when Roy then
testified that it was not the establishment but the widespread use of the
social security number in the government's computer system that would
rob his daughter's spirit.1" The court's focus was thereby shifted from
an examination of the contention that the government was requiring an
individual to act contrary to her beliefs (obtaining and furnishing a
social security number), to scrutiny of the assertion that the government
was threatening to act in a manner that was contrary to an individual's
religion (using the number in the computer systems)." The district
court, nevertheless, enjoined the government from using or disseminat-
ing the social security number issued in the name of Little Bird of the
Snow Roy. 15 The court also required the government to provide bene-
fits for Little Bird of the Snow without requiring her to "furnish" a
9 Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2150. Roy testified to his belief that "control over one's life is
essential to spiritual purity and indispensable to 'becoming a holy person,' . . . [and]
that technology is 'robbing the spirit of man.'" Id. He further testified that in order to
prepare his daughter for greater spiritual power, he must "keep her person and spirit
unique and that the uniqueness of the Social Security number as an identifier, coupled
with the other uses of the number over which she has no control, will serve to 'rob the
spirit' of his daughter and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power." Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 2150-51.
'2 Id. at 2151.
13 Id.
14 All other religious challenges to social security number requirements have re-
lated specifically to the government requiring the individual to act contrary to her reli-
gion by obtaining a number. See, e.g., Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269, 1271 (9th
Cir. 1984)(religious belief that social security numbers are "the mark of the beast" by
which the Antichrist endeavors to control mankind); Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp.
896, 897 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (religious belief that the use of social security numbers is a
device of the Antichrist).
'5 Roy v. Cohen, 590 F. Supp. 600, 614 (M.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Bowen




On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court by
underscoring the distinction between individual and governmental con-
duct.1" Specifically, the Court ruled that although free exercise protec-
tion is provided when a law requires an individual to act contrary to
her religion (or refrain from acting in accordance with it), no free exer-
cise protection is provided when a law results in an action by the gov-
ernment that, although it may impede an individual's religious beliefs,
does not require or prevent any action by the individual. In the Court's
view, Roy's objection could not be sustained because the "use" of an
existing social security number already in the government's possession
involved only governmental action (no action by Roy was required or
prevented).
The Court thus fashioned a bright-line test to determine when free
exercise protection would be accorded. Eight members of the Court
concurred in this position, 8 thus displaying unusually strong support
for the decision. Such enthusiastic support is disquieting not only be-
cause the Court's rationale is severely flawed,19 but the resulting stan-
dard is at worst a curtailment of free exercise protection20 and at best
unworkable.2"
16 Id. This injunction, however, was only extended until Little Bird of the Snow's
16th birthday. Id. For a general discussion of the standard applied in evaluating the
claim regarding "furnishing" of the number, see Note, Roy v. Cohen: Social Security
Numbers and the Free Exercise Clause, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 217 (1986).
17 Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2152 n.6 (noting that "it is clear ... that the Free Exercise
Clause, and the Constitution generally, recognize such a distinction" between individ-
ual and governmental conduct).
s See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Justice White dissented from the en-
tire opinion but did not expressly address the question of whether the free exercise
clause extends to an individual's objecting to governmental actions. Roy, 106 S. Ct. at
2169 (White, J. dissenting).
Regarding the issue of "furnishing" a number, the Court was divided. Chief Jus-
tice Burger, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, ruled that requiring applicants to
furnish their social security numbers as a condition for eligibility for governmental ben-
efits does not violate the free exercise clause. Id. at 2153-58. In order to reverse the
second injunction, Chief Justice Burger would have invoked a new standard for deter-
mining the validity of government regulations under the free exercise clause. Id. at
2156. Under this new standard, the government would "meet[] its burden when it dem-
onstrates that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform
in its application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest." Id.
This portion of the opinion, however, was joined only by Justices Powell and Rehn-
quist. Id. at 2149. See supra note 4.
1" See infra notes 22-46 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 47-103 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 104-37 and accompanying text.
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B. Analysis of Bowen v. Roy: A Flawed Rationale
1. The Failure to Adequately Justify the Distinction Between
Individual and Governmental Action
The Roy Court proffered three justifications for failing to provide
free exercise protection to individuals objecting to governmental actions
that, although not requiring or preventing any individual action, never-
theless encumber the individual's religion. Unfortunately, these justifi-
cations are unpersuasive. First, the Court insisted that historically no
free exercise protection had ever been provided in this context: "Never
to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to
require the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual
believes will further his or her spiritual development or that of his or
her family."22 Although this may be true, the converse is also true: the
first amendment had never been interpreted to bar free exercise claims
by individuals objecting to purely governmental actions. The Court had
never explicitly dealt with the issue. Moreover, in other free exercise
contexts, protection had been given sub silentio to individuals objecting
to governmental actions that did not require or prevent any action by
the individual. For instance, without noting the distinction between in-
dividual and governmental conduct, courts have protected individuals
by requiring the government to show a sufficiently important state in-
terest before allowing it to photograph members of the Pentecostal
church for drivers' licenses, 23 to give blood transfusions and other medi-
cal treatment to Christian Scientists and Jehovah's Witnesses,2 4 to have
female guards frisk male Muslim prisoners,2' and to develop public
lands that are sacred to Hopi and Navajo Indians."6 Courts thus have
implicitly provided free exercise protection to individuals objecting to
purely governmental actions; and the Supreme Court has given either
open or tacit approval to these decisions.
27
The Court's second justification was that an individual cannot re-
quire the government to join in her religious practices. Specifically, the
Court stated:
The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to
require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs
22 Roy, 106 S.,Ct. at 2152.
21 See infra notes 50-68 and accompanying text. In one of these cases, the Su-
preme Court affirmed the decision. See infra note 66.
24 See infra notes 69-85 and accompanying text.
a See infra notes 86-103 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 112-37 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 66, 82-84, 86, and accompanying text.
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in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular
citizens. Just as the Government may not insist that appel-
lees engage in any set form of religious observance, so appel-
lees may not demand that the Government join in their cho-
sen religious practices by refraining from using a number to
identify their daughter. 8
This argument, however, fails to recognize the distinction between re-
quiring the government to follow an individual's religion and requiring
the government to refrain from acting in ways that would obstruct an
individual's religious belief. Consider the situation where a member of
religion X institutes a challenge to the government practice of having
offices open on Saturday because it is her sabbath. This is precisely the
type of challenge about which the Court was concerned: the individual
is attempting to force the government to join in her religion. Taken to
its extreme, if there were seven religions, each with a different day of
the week as its sabbath, government offices could never open. Obvi-
ously, the Court has voiced a valid objection: to permit such challenges
would be to completely frustrate government functioning.
Compare, however, the situation where members of religion Y be-
lieve that a specific two-hundred-year-old majestic oak is a living deity.
The members of the religion pray to the tree and believe that if it is cut
down their religion would be destroyed. The members learn that the
government intends to cut down the tree in order to accommodate plans
to build a road. By shifting the proposed road one hundred feet east the
government could save the tree; and the alteration would not cause
problems or entail any additional expense. The government, neverthe-
less, refuses to alter its plans even though members of religion Y object.
In this situation, these individuals do not want the government to join
their religion; rather, they want the government to refrain from acting
in a manner that would make it impossible for them to continue to
follow their religion.
In both of these situations, the governmental action conflicts with
the religion and the only action involved is action by the government
(no individual action is required or prevented). However, in the first
situation, an individual is attempting to force the government to follow
her religion, while in the second she is trying to prevent the government
from acting in a manner that would impede her ability to comply with
her religion. The situation in Roy is analogous to the second situation.
Roy does not want the government to refrain from using social security
numbers thereby obligating the government to join his religion; he sim-
28 Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2152.
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ply requests that the government refrain from using a number for his
daughter because he believes that if a number is used Little Bird of the
Snow will be unable to comply with her religion.29
The Court's final argument in favor of the distinction was by
analogy: "Roy may no more prevail on his religious objection to the
government's use of a Social Security number for his daughter than he
could on a sincere religious objection to the size or color of the Govern-
ment's filing cabinets.""0 There are, however, several important
problems with this analogy. First, the fact that the government's filing
cabinets are grey or a particular size involves a present condition; it
does not involve a government action. Roy does not object to the gov-
ernment possessing computers (a present condition), he only objects to
the government using his daughter's social security number in the com-
puters (a governmental action). The only way to implicate a govern-
mental action would be for an individual to object to the government
using the cabinets in a particular manner. Second, the size or color of
the government's filing cabinets would not ordinarily be known to the
public, whereas the government's use of Little Bird of the Snow's social
security number is mandated by federal statute.3 The individual
would, therefore, lack the knowledge of wrongdoing necessary to chal-
lenge the condition and, in some religions, necessary to give rise to a
violation of the religion's tenets. 2 Finally, the size or color of filing
cabinets is not directed at a specific individual. The social security
number requirement, however, is specifically aimed at Little Bird of
the Snow. Accordingly, to the extent that it is an action at all, having
filing cabinets is a "general" governmental action; and conversely, the
application of the social security number to Little Bird of the Snow is a
"specific" governmental action. It is an essential argument of this Com-
ment that challenges to general governmental actions should only be
29 Id. at 2150.
30 Id. at 2152.
31 Id. at 2151. See supra note 8.
2 In Judaism, there are three ways to violate a religious tenet: intentionally, un-
knowingly, and accidentally. If a violation is intentional, it is necessarily considered a
sin. If a violation is accidental or forced, it is not considered a sin. In the middle situa-
tion, where a violation is considered unknowing, the violation, although it is still con-
sidered a sin, is deemed to be one of a lower level. Telephone Interview with Rabbi
Moshe Schwartz, Hallandale, Florida (Aug. 16, 1987); see MAIMONIDES, BOOK OF
MISHNA TORAH, ch. 2 (Laws of Sacrifices). An example of this third category is when
a follower of the religion is trapped in a desert, loses track of the days, and, thinking
that it is Thursday, works on a Saturday in violation of her Sabbath. In such a case,
even though the violation was committed unknowingly, the individual still committed a
lower-level sin because she should have known that it was the Sabbath. Thus, at the
time when offerings are allowed to be brought, she would be required to bring one. See
MAIMONIDES, supra; THE TALMUD, tractate shabbot, 67b.
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recognized when the individual first demonstrates that the action would
impede her ability to choose or follow her religion,"3 giving rise to a
threshold question that would further limit the cause of action."
The filing cabinet analogy has great intuitive appeal because it is
nearly impossible to imagine a sincere religious objection to the size or
color of a filing cabinet. Nevertheless, sincere objections can be raised.
Suppose the members of religion Z believe that red is the color of the
devil and if they or their likenesses are confined to a small, red place
they will be eternally damned. The government informs A, a member
of religion Z, that if she applies for welfare her photograph will be
placed in a small, red filing cabinet. She objects, seeking an exemption.
In this situation, the individual is objecting to a governmental action
that is being specifically applied against her. As in Roy, the individual
is forced to choose between her physical sustenance and the tenets of
her religion. Because this type of action impairs the individual's ability
to believe in her religion, courts should provide free exercise protection.
2. Individual Versus Governmental Action: An Arbitrary
Distinction
The distinction between individual and governmental action is in-
dicative of neither the severity of the consequences of the action, nor the
difficulty of the choice forced upon the individual. As a result, because
alternative rationales offered by the Court have proven to be infirm, the
distinction is purely arbitrary.
Take for example a situation where the government plans to build
a shopping mall on a particular tract of land; and both A and B, mem-
bers of religions X and Y, respectively, believe that this land is sacred.
In their eyes, development of the land would be an affront to their
deities and destroy their respective religions. The critical difference is
that members of religion X hold ceremonies and collect herbs on the
land, while members of religion Y never trespass on the land. A, there-
fore, objects to the shopping center because it prevents her from per-
forming the herb collecting ritual that is the very essence of her faith.
B, on the other hand, objects to the shopping center because it would
destroy the land that is the focal object of her religious worship. Al-
though A and B both face the destruction of their faith should the shop-
ping center be erected, the Roy distinction would recognize A's claim
because she would be precluded from traversing the land, but it would
not recognize A's claim because although she is estopped from believ-
33 See infra notes 148-54.
34 See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
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ing, she is not precluded from executing any physical act.
In Roy, a regulation conditioned the receipt of welfare benefits on
each applicant providing a social security number and the government
using that number in its computer system. Assume that there are two
individuals, C and D, applying for benefits. C's religion prevents her
from applying for and providing a unique numerical identifier, while
D's religion permits her to provide the numbers so long as they are not
dispersed throughout the computer system. The crucial difference be-
tween these two situations is that C cannot provide a social security
number, while D may provide a number but would later be harmed by
its misuse by the government. Under the Roy distinction, C would be
given free exercise protection while D would not, even though both C
and D are faced with the same difficult choice between their religious
beliefs and a government benefit.
The Court's underlying assumption can only have been that A and
C have stronger claims because an individual, rather than governmen-
tal, action is involved: But on the contrary, this hypothetical demon-
strates that the weight of a free exercise claim is unrelated to whether
an individual action is subverted.
3. The Underlying Purpose of the Free Exercise Clause
The Roy standard, by failing to protect an individual objecting to a
governmental action that impedes her religion but does not require or
prevent any action on her part, violates the underlying purposes of the
two religion clauses of the first amendment."5 The free exercise clause
and the establishment clause together36 stand for the proposition that
an individual should be able to choose and follow a religion free from
governmental interference. In Abington School District v. Schempp
17
the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he Free Exercise Clause. . . recognizes the value of reli-
gious training, teaching and observance and, more particu-
larly, the right of every person to freely choose his own
course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from
the state. This the Free Exercise Clause guarantees. . . . Its
35 See, e.g., Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of
Public Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447, 1465 (1985).
8" See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982) ("This constitutional prohibi-
tion of denominational preferences is inextricably connected with the continuing vitality
of the Free Exercise Clause."); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215
(1963) (noting that the establishment and free exercise clauses place the Government in
a "neutral" position).
37 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by
prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority. 8
James Madison believed that freedom for all religions is best guaran-
teed by free competition between religions.' Thus, governmental inter-
ference, in either a positive or a negative sense, must be prohibited. °
The government must remain neutral in relation to all religions, 41 or-
thodox as well as unusual,42 and also between religious believers and
nonbelievers.43 The government may not act in ways that would aid or
handicap any religion." Hence, proposed actions by the government
that would impede the ability of an individual to choose or follow a
religion should be justified by a sufficiently important governmental in-
terest, even if no action by the members of the religion are required (or
prevented). The ability of an individual to choose or follow a religion is
necessarily impeded when the government acts in a manner that would
38 Id. at 222-23; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (stating
that the purpose of the establishment and free exercise clauses is to prevent, as far as
possible, the intrusion of either the church or the state into the precincts of the other).
3' See, e.g., The Federalist No. 51, at 324 (1901 ed.) ("[Siecurity for civil rights
must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplic-
ity of interests and in the other in the multiplicity of sects."); see also Larson, 456 U.S.
at 245 ("Madison's vision-freedom for all religion being guaranteed by free competi-
tion between religions-naturally assumed that every denomination would be equally
at liberty to exercise and propagate its beliefs.").
40 See Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 (stating that the state may not adopt programs or
practices that aid or oppose any religion); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226 (stating that "it is not within the power of govern-
ment to invade that citadel [of the individual heart and mind], whether its purpose or
effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard").
41 See Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 (stating the general principle of denominational
neutrality); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104 (stating that "[t]he First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religions"); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 305 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) ("The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government
...effect no favoritism among sects . . . and that it work deterrence of no religious
belief."); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ("The government must be
neutral when it comes to competition between sects.").
"I See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714
(1981) ("religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible
to others in order to merit First Amendment protection"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 416 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (stating that the "Constitution
commands the positive protection by government of religious freedom-not only for a
minority, however small-not only for the majority, however large-but for each of
us"); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1953) (constitutional protection for
religious beliefs that are unusual or only held by a few people); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 207-13 (idiosyncratic separateness of Old Order Amish exemplifies the
diversity of protection by the free exercise clause).
3 See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. at 218 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 18 (1947)).
44 See, e.g., id. at 215 ("The government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it
prefers none, and it disparages none." (quoting an unpublished opinion)); see also
supra note 40.
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destroy45 or handicap46 a religion.
II. Bowen v. Roy: SHIFTING THE FOUNDATION OF FREE EXERCISE
PROTECTION
A. Rolling Back Free Exercise Protection
In the past, courts have applied traditional free exercise protection
in three situations involving action only by the government:
photographing applicants for drivers' licenses, 47 administering medical
treatment,48 and frisking prisoners.49 In each of these situations, the
Court expressed approval for some level of protection. The Roy stan-
dard therefore represents an unjustified retrenchment of free exercise
protection.
1. Requiring Photographs for Drivers' Licenses
In most states, every applicant for a driver's license must be photo-
graphed. 50 Generally, states require that this photograph be taken and
processed by the state's motor vehicle division. 5' This photograph re-
' For example, in Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 740 n.2 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983), if the government acts by expanding the ski resort, then
the Hopi Indian religion may become extinct. See infra note 127. See also Sequoyah v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.) cert. denied 449 U.S. 953 (1980)
(challenging the flooding of an Indian religious site); Greenawalt, Religion as a Con-
cept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753, 781 n.109 (1984) (discussing novel
Indian claims).
"' For example, if the government threatens to act in a way that would cause an
individual spiritual unrest if she applies for a governmental benefit, then the individual
is forced to choose between the benefit and the dictates of her faith. Accordingly, the
individual, through her religion, is handicapped and should receive constitutional pro-
tection. Specifically, the government can handicap religious beliefs by insisting on using
an individual's social security number if she applies for welfare benefits or requiring
her to be photographed for a driver's license. See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying
text.
' See infra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 69-85 and accompanying text.
'9 See infra notes 86-103 and accompanying text.
50 See e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 12800.84 (West 1971 & Supp. 1987); IND. CODE
ANN. § 9-1-4-37(b) (Supp. 1986). Overall, at least 47 states require photographs of
the licensee to appear on drivers' licenses. See Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121,
1126 (8th Cir. 1984), aft'd sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (af-
firmed by an equally divided Court, Justice Powell not participating, without opinion).
However, New York, one of the nation's most populous states, does not statutorily
require photographs on drivers' licenses. Id. at 1126 n.5. See also COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 42-2-106(3) (1973) (abolishing photograph requirement) (repealed 1979).
"' See e.g. COLO. REv. STAT. § 42-2-106(3) (1973) ("Such photograph shall be
taken and processed with equipment leased or owned by the department.") (repealed
1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-1-4-37(f) (Supp. 1986) ("In carrying out the provisions of
this section the commissioner shall undertake to obtain the equipment necessary to pro-
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quirement conflicts with several religions, among them the Pentecostal
House of Prayer52 and the Assembly of YHWHHOSHUA, 53 whose
members believe in a literal interpretation of the Bible." Several cases
have arisen throughout the country relating to this conflict.5 5 For ex-
ample, in Quaring v. Peterson,"6 Francis Quaring sought a Nebraska
driver's license but refused to allow the state to take her photograph as
required by Nebraska law.57 A Pentecostal Christian, Quaring based
her refusal on her religious conviction that the Second Commandment
is violated by creating a likeness of God's creation.58
After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain an exemption from the
photograph requirement, Quaring brought suit against the Nebraska
Department of Motor Vehicles. 59 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit ruled that "[c]learly, a burden upon Quaring's free exercise of
religion exists in this case." 0 The court balanced the State's interest in
driver identification and in administrative efficiency against the burden
on Quaring's religious beliefs.61 Judge Bright, writing for the court,
concluded that the state's interests62 did not outweigh Quaring's inter-
est in religious liberty because the state already had a process for ac-
commodating photograph exemptions and the number of persons who
would seek such an exemption for religious reasons would most likely
vide the photographs for permits and license. .. ").
52 See Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., 269 Ind.
361, 380 N.E.2d 1225 (1978) (enjoining the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles from
requiring members of the Pentecostal House of God to have photographs on their driv-
ers' licenses).
51 See Dennis v. Charnes, 646 F. Supp. 158 (D. Colo. 1986) (enjoining the Colo-
rado Motor Vehicles Division from requiring members of Assembly of
YHWHHOSHUA to have photographs on their drivers' licenses); Johnson v. Motor
Vehicle Div., 197 Colo. 445, 593 P.2d 1363 (refusing to enjoin the same), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 885 (1979).
, The Assembly of YHWHHOSHUA and Pentecostal House of Prayer derive
their beliefs from a literal interpretation of the second Commandment: "Thou shalt not
make unto thee any graven image or likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or
that is the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth." Quaring, 728 F.2d
1121, 1123 (citing Exodus 20:4 and Deuteronomy 5:8). Followers of these religions
believe that the Commandment is violated by creating a likeness of God's creation. Id.
" See, e.g., id.; Dennis, 646 F. Supp. at 158; Johnson, 197 Colo. at 455, 593
P.2d at 1363; Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 269 Ind. at 361, 380 N.E.2d at 1225.
56 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), af'd sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S.
478 (1985).
" See id. at 1122.
5 See id. at 1123. "Quaring's belief extends beyond her refusal to have her photo-
graph taken and allowing it to appear on her driver's license. She believes that the
Second Commandment forbids her from possessing any image having a likeness of any-
thing in creation." Id. at 1123.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1125.
61 Id.
2 See id. at 1127.
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be small."' On this basis, the appellate court affirmed the district
court's injunction ordering Nebraska officials to issue Quaring a
driver's license without requiring that she be photographed."
In all of the cases involving religious objections to photograph re-
quirements, the courts have applied traditional free exercise doctrine
and have balanced the state's interest against the burden on religion. 5
The Supreme Court affirmed the Quaring decision on this basis.6 The
standard applied by the courts in this context was the standard that the
Supreme Court now insists is reserved for situations in which the gov-
ernment is requiring an individual to act contrary to her religious be-
lief. But in fact, the government was not requiring the individual to act
at all. The government was directing action at the individual.6 "
" Id. at 1127. This argument raises the interesting issue of whether the amount
of religious liberty to which an individual is entitled should be predicated on the num-
ber of other people sharing the belief. For example, in Quaring the court ruled that the
interest in administrative efficiency was not sufficiently compelling because only a small
number of persons would seek an exemption (i.e. share Quaring's belief). Id. If more
people had shared the belief, then the interest in administrative efficiency would pre-
sumably be greater and the court may have denied the exemption. The protection of an
individual's religious liberty should not, however, be related to the number of other
people that share her beliefs. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 420 n.2 (1963)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 327, 332-33 (1969).
See Quaring, 728 F.2d at 1128.
65 See id. at 1126-27; Dennis v. Charnes, 646 F. Supp. 158, 163 (D. Colo. 1986);
Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., 197 Colo. 455, 458-59, 593 P.2d 1363, 1365 (1979);
Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc. 269 Ind. 361, 368-69,
380 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (1978). The major state interest involved has been that police
must be able to identify motorists quickly and accurately in order to ensure that only
licensed motorists drive. See Quaring, 728 F.2d at 1126; Dennis, 646 F. Supp. at 168;
Johnson, 197 Colo. at 458-59, 593 P.2d at 1365; Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 269 Ind.
at 368-69, 380 N.E.2d at 1229. The courts, although they have consistently applied a
balancing test in this context, have split as to whether this interest is sufficiently com-
pelling to justify burdening the individual's religion. Compare Quaring, 728 F.2d at
1126-27 (government did not demonstrate a compelling state interest because giving an
exemption to those with religious objections would not cause any undue administrative
burdens) and Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 269 Ind. at 369, 380 N.E.2d at 1229 (state's
interest in the photograph requirement is not so compelling that it may be allowed to
infringe on religious freedom) with Johnson, 197 Colo. at 459, 593 P.2d at 1366
(state's interest in photographic identification is so compelling that the individual's
challenge must fail). See generally Casenote, Free Exercise of Religion--State May
Require a Photograph on a Drivers License Though the Licensee's Religious Beliefs
Prohibit Photographs of Any Type-Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Division, 593 P.2d
1393 (Colo. 1979), 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 471, 483 (concluding that exemptions from
the photograph requirements for individuals with religious objections is an acceptable,
less burdensome alternative).
6 The Supreme Court affirmed Quaring v. Peterson without an opinion on a
four to four vote. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985). Justice Powell took no part
in the decision. Id. For a general discussion of Quaring v. Peterson, see Pepper,
'Quaring' May Help Supreme Court Clarjfy Religious Freedom Doctrine, Nat'l L. J.,
April 8, 1985, at 24.
67 The individuals object specifically to the government photographing them, not
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The situation is analogous to Roy. There, Roy objected to the So-
cial Security Administration's use of Little Bird of the Snow's social
security number in its computer system; here, the individual is objecting
to the government taking a photograph. In either scenario, government
action, not intentionally precipitating acts or omissions by the individ-
ual, serves to obstruct the individual's exercise of her religion. Of
course, there is a difference in that the individual must be present to be
photographed but is not present when the government uses the social
security number in its computers. In both situations, however, the ac-
tive party is the government, not the individual. 8 Had the Roy distinc-
tion between governmental and individual action been drawn in the
driver's license photograph cases, it is conceivable that the courts would
not even have considered the state interest involved, concluding instead
that the individuals had not stated a protectable free exercise claim.
2. Administering Medical Treatment to Individuals over Their
Religious Objections
Jehovah's Witnesses and Christian Scientists believe that certain
medical treatments and blood transfusions violate their religious be-
liefs."' Situations have arisen where hospitals are faced with conflicts
to providing a photograph. See, e.g., Johnson, 197 Colo. at 457, 593 P.2d at 1364 (The
individuals argue that "any requirement that they be photographed before they may be
issued a driver's license violates their right to the free exercise of their religion.").
8 In both cases an argument could be made that the individual is acting by al-
lowing the government to use the social security number in the computers or by al-
lowing the government to take the photograph. This argument is purely semantic (by
definition, being photographed is passive while photographing is active) and was not
considered by the Supreme Court in Roy.
" See e.g. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir.) (involving a Christian
Scientist who objected to medication based on her religious beliefs), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 985 (1971); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 746 n.1 (D.C. 1979) (same); Mercy Hos-
pital Inc. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 411, 489 A.2d 1130, 1131 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1985) (noting that a Jehovah's Witness "may not, under any circumstances, receive
blood transfusions"), vacated 306 Md. 556, 510 A.2d 562 (1986) (vacating as moot);
see also Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 92, 122-
25 (1974) (noting First Amendment issue in the area of compulsory amniocentesis);
Gobert, Psychosurgery, Conditioning, and the Prisoner's Right to Refuse 'Rehabilita-
tion', 61 VA. L. REv. 155, 165 (1975) (noting First Amendment issue in the area of
correctional therapy); Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Re-
search, 65 MINN. L. REV. 331, 350 (1981) (same). Jehovah's Witnesses believe and
accept as authority the admonition of Jehovah found in the Holy Bible commanding
Christians to "abstain from blood." Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F.
Supp. 488, 502 (W.D. Wash. 1967). The belief of Jehovah's Witnesses respecting
blood transfusions is based on two passages from the Bible. See id. at 502 n.8. (citing
Acts of the Apostles, 15:20 ("Hence my decision is not to trouble those from the nations
who are turning to God, but to write to them to abstain from things polluted by idols
and from fornication and from what is strangled and from blood.")), and id. (citing
Leviticus, 17:10 ("As for any man of the house of Israel or some alien resident ...
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between an individual's religious objection to treatment and the doctor's
desire to preserve the patient's life. For example, in Mercy Hospital,
Inc. v. Jackson°7 0 Mrs. Jackson was admitted into Mercy Hospital
while in premature labor. The hospital staff recommended that she un-
dergo a Caesarean delivery.71 As a Jehovah's Witness, one of the basic
tenets of Mrs. Jackson's faith was that she not, under any circum-
stances, receive a blood transfusion. 72 The hospital staff informed her
that there was a forty to fifty percent chance that she would need a
transfusion during a Caesarian delivery, and that if the need arose and
no transfusion were made she would die. " The delivery without blood
transfusions, however, would pose virtually no threat to the health of
the fetus.74 Despite the significant risk to her life, Mrs. Jackson and
her husband steadfastly refused to compromise their religious belief and
requested that the delivery proceed without blood transfusions.7"
Because the hospital staff believed the medical risk was unaccept-
able, they petitioned for the appointment of a guardian for Mrs. Jack-
son with the authority to consent to blood transfusions for her."8 The
court denied the hospital's application for guardianship, the operation
occurred without the use of transfusions, and both Mrs. Jackson and
the child survived the surgery." The hospital appealed the decision,78
and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, noting the importance of
who eats any sort of blood, I shall certainly set my face against the soul that is eating
the blood, and I shall indeed cut him off from among his people.")).
In Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1980), a member of the Church of God
challenged a decision by the Social Security Administration denying her disability bene-
fits. Unlike the Jehovah's Witnesses and Christian Scientists, members of the Church
of God can undergo surgery. Consistent with her religious beliefs, however, Ms. Lewis
decided to rely on the "power of prayer." The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that the first amendment protected individual conscience and rejected the govern-
ment's argument that "an individual's belief which is not a tenet of the church in which
she worships is not a belief protected by the First Amendment .... " Id. at 79.
70 62 Md. App. at 409, 489 A.2d at 1130.
71 Id. at 411, 489 A.2d at 1131.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 412 n.2, 489 A.2d at 1131 n.2.
75 Id. at 411-12, 489 A.2d at 1131.
78 Id. at 412, 489 A.2d at 1131.
77 Id.
78 The purpose of the appeal was to establish a precedent to guide the courts in
future similar situations, not to adjudicate rights between the parties. Ordinarily, the
case would have been moot because the surgery was concluded, the child was born, and
the patient had been discharged. Id. at 413, 489 A.2d. at 1132. However, "[b]ecause of
the probability of repetition and the substantial likelihood that the matter will always
be moot by the time it reaches an appellate court," the court "deem[ed] it to be in the
public interest ...to answer Mercy's question." Id. But see Mercy Hosp., Inc. v.
Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 510 A.2d 562 (1986) (vacating the decision of the Court of
Special Appeals as moot).
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religious freedom, applied a compelling state interest test."9 The court
ruled that a competent, pregnant adult has the right to refuse a blood
transfusion in order that she comply with her religious beliefs, so long
as the decision is made knowingly and voluntarily and will not endan-
ger the delivery, survival, or support of the fetus."0 Although the deci-
sion was later vacated as moot, the court's rationale, reasoning and res-
olution of the merits was neither affected nor questioned.
Applying the Roy standard, the Jackson case did not involve indi-
vidual action because Mrs. Jackson was not required to inject herself.
Nonetheless, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals applied the very
balance that Roy rejects in cases where courts determine that exclu-
sively governmental action was involved-action that did not precipitate
or preclude individual action. Likewise, other courts have employed a
balancing test when scrutinizing the forced administration of medica-
tion against the backdrop of a free exercise challenge, even though, like
Jackson, individual action was not present."1 Although the Supreme
7 Id. at 415, 489 A.2d at 1133.
80 Id. at 418, 489 A.2d at 1134. In other cases, courts have extended the right to
refuse medical treatment on religious grounds to involuntarily committed mental pa-
tients. Specifically, a court held that an involuntarily committed patient who had not
been found by any court to be mentally incompetent cannot be given medication which
would violate her religious beliefs:
[W]here there is clear evidence that appellant's religious beliefs pre-dated
by some years any allegations of mental illness and where there was no
contention that the current alleged mental illness in any way altered these
views, there is no justification for defendants-appellees to substitute their
own judgment for that of their patient.
Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971). Fur-
thermore, even when a patient has been adjudicated mentally ill and incompetent, a
hospital cannot administer medication to her if, before her illness and incompetency,
she had rejected any use of medication on religious grounds. See In re Boyd, 403 A.2d.
744, 753 (D.C. 1979) (adopting the "substituted judgment" standard). But the right to
refuse medical treatment on religious grounds is not absolute. If a blood transfusion is
necessary to the well-being of a child, a court can authorize it despite the express objec-
tion of parents who are opposed to transfusions on religious grounds. See, e.g., Jeho-
vah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 503-505 (W.D. Wash.
1967), affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104
N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181
A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); see also Richards, The Individual, the
Family and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 155 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1,
50,52 (1980) (discussing the tension between parents and the state when parents object
to lifesaving medical procedures on religious grounds); Robertson, Involuntary Eutha-
nasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 213, 216 (1975)
(raising the issue of euthanasia of defective newborns in light of legal precedent over-
ruling the right of parents to block medical treatment of their children).
The state can also require compulsory vaccinations in the interest of public health.
See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (state can require vaccination);
Calandra v. State College Area School Dist., 512 A.2d 809 (1986) (state can require
tetanus immunization as a condition for participation in interscholastic sports).
81 See supra note 69.
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Court denied certiorari in these cases, 2 its adoption of the Roy stan-
dard appears to demonstrate a nascent disapproval for these results.
While involving only governmental, not individual, action, this
genre of case differs notably from Roy's social security number require-
ment and Quaring's photograph requirement in two ways. First, the
governmental action in the medical treatment cases has a physical, as
well as spiritual, effect on the individual. In the social security number
and photograph requirement cases, the individual is spiritually, but not
physically, affected. However, the Supreme Court has never required
an individual to prove that failure to follow her religion would cause
physical harm; spiritual harm has always been sufficient." Second, the
medical treatment cases involve an unprovoked governmental action:
the individual has no say whatsoever. The social security number and
photograph requirement cases involve responsive governmental action:
the government acts only if the individual applies for a governmental
benefit. The courts, however, have generally rejected the distinction be-
tween unprovoked and responsive burdens on religious liberty and pro-
tected individuals against both.8" In the medical treatment cases, the
82 See, e.g., Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985
(1971).
8 For example, in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security
Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), the Court provided free exercise protection to a Jeho-
vah's Witness who claimed that his religion forbade participation in production of
armaments. See id. at 710-12. The Court did not require Thomas to prove that he
would suffer physical harm if he participated in building armaments; potential spiritual
harm was sufficient. See id.; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (free
exercise protection given to individual claiming that religion prevented her from work-
ing on Saturdays without requiring her to prove physical harm would occur if she
violated her religion).
See, e.g., Osgood v. District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 1026, 1035-36 (D.D.C.
1983) (noting that a plaintiff must establish that at the time she faced treatment she
believed that the treatment would violate her religion even if she did not consent to the
treatment). Moreover, in this context responsive governmental action may actually be
more objectionable than direct governmental action. In the case of an unprovoked, di-
rect governmental action, the individual is not acting by consenting to the action (i.e.
the medical treatment) because the government acts not only without the individual's
consent, but also against her will. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. In the case of the
responsive indirect governmental action, if the governmental conditions a benefit upon a
specific act by the government, the individual is implicated in the action by applying for
the benefit. Thus, a responsive indirect governmental action presents as strong, if not a
stronger claim for protection as an unprovoked direct governmental action.
Another distinction between the medical treatment cases and the social security
number and photograph requirement cases is that the medical treatment cases also im-
plicate the general rights to refuse treatment and to bodily integrity. These rights are
considered in balancing the state's interest against the individual's interest. See, e.g.,
Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 415-16, 489 A.2d 1130, 1133 (1985).
However, because this Comment is concerned with when the balancing test should be
applied, and not how it should be applied, the implications of the rights to refuse treat-
ment and to bodily integrity on the balancing are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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individual, although greatly affected by the governmental action, is
neither required nor prevented from doing any act herself. However,
the individual undoubtedly believes that the governmental action has a
profound impact on her spiritual well-being. Similarly, in Roy, the
plaintiff believed that the government's use of Little Bird of the Snow's
social security number would have a profound impact on her spiritual
well-being.85 Nevertheless, based on the distinction drawn in Roy, both
claims would be unprotected by the free exercise clause because they
involve action by the government but not by the individual.
3. The Frisking of Male Prisoners by Female Guards
In America, "convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional
protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison." '
In general, the Supreme Court has held that "reasonable opportunities
must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guar-
anteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments without fear of pen-
alty."18 7 However, "while inmates are not stripped of their constitu-
tional rights at the prison gate," these rights are properly subject to a
"greater degree of intrusion than would be allowed outside the prison
gate."
88
The need for security in prisons requires guards to search and
frisk prisoners to ensure that they do not have weapons. Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 196489 requires prisons to hire women as
For a general discussion of these rights, see Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline
Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26
RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1973).
85 Roy testified that Little Bird of the Snow's spirit would be robbed and she
would be prevented from attaining greater spiritual power. Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct.
2147, 2150 (1986).
88 Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 958 (7th Cir.) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983).
87 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972); See also Madyun, 704 F.2d at
958. The free exercise rights of prisoners have been recognized in several contexts. See,
e.g., Burgin v. Henderson, 536 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1976) (right to grow a beard for
religious purposes); Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969) (right of access
to religious literature); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967) (right to religious
services); United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) afl'd sub nom.
Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F:2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975) (special diet based on religious
restrictions).
" Madyun, 704 F.2d at 958. See also Bell, 441 U.S. at 545 ("[S]imply because
prison inmates retain certain constitutional rights does not mean that these rights are
not subject to restrictions and limitations."); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285
(1948) ("Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitations of
many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our
penal system.").
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (1982).
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guards in male prisons. 9u However, some male prisoners, based on reli-
gious beliefs, object to being touched by female guards.9 In Madyun v.
Franzen,92 a male prisoner refused to submit to a "frisk search"9' 3 by a
female guard because it violated his Islamic faith.94 Ultimately, a male
correctional officer was summoned to perform the search. The guard,
however, filed a report, citing Madyun for disobedience, and he re-
ceived a fifteen-day "segregation" sentence by the prison disciplinary
committee.9 5 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, noting that
even a limited frisk search conducted by women guards may be incom-
patible with the tenets of Madyun's religion, applied a balancing test to
determine whether the intrusion was justified by a state interest of suf-
ficient magnitude." However, because Madyun was a prisoner, the
court reduced the burden on the government to justify the intrusion on
Madyun's religious liberty. 7 Specifically, the court held that "prison
rules that incidentally restrain the free exercise of religion are justified
only 'if the state regulation has an important objective and the restraint
on religious liberty is reasonably adapted to achieving that objec-
tive.' "98 The court further held that this burden was met because the
state demonstrated a substantial interest in having its women guards
perform frisk searches on male inmates.99
90 See, e.g., Madyun, 704 F.2d at 961; Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 54 (7th
Cir. 1982) ("If a state is required to hire women as guards in its male prisons, it
reasonably seems to follow that it must be allowed to utilize female guards to the fullest
extent possible."), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983).
91 See Madyun, 704 F.2d at 956 (physical contact between a man and a woman
other than his wife or mother is incompatible with the tenets of Islamic religion).
92 704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983).
9 Id. at 956. The female officer gave the following description of her "frisk
search:" "The resident is asked to raise his arms. I then run my thumbs under his
collar, take my hands and rub them across the top of his arms, come back under his
arms to his armpits and down his side to his waist. I run my finger around his waist-
band. I run my hands down the outside of his legs and back up to mid thigh. I then
reach around and pat his chest area and his back." Id. at 956 n.1.
9 Id. at 956.
15 Id. at 956.
96 Id. at 957-58.
9 Id. at 958.
91 Id. at 959-60 (quoting La Reau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973)). This standard is much lower than the com-
pelling state interest that is generally required. See supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
9' Madyun, 704 F.2d at 960. The court reasoned that frisk searches are an "inte-
gral part of prison security and an important part of a guard's duty. If women are not
allowed to perform these limited searches . . . [then] the utility of women prison
guards would be significantly diminished." Id. Thus, in order to provide equal oppor-
tunity for women in state prisons, which is a legal obligation of the state under Title




Religious claims by male prisoners arising from frisk searches by
female guards are similar to Roy in that both situations involve action
by government agents; no action by the individual is required or pre-
vented. Of course, requiring a frisk search is somewhat different from
threatening to use a social security number in a computer if an individ-
ual applies for a governmental benefit. Frisk searches, similar to medi-
cal treatment, are unprovoked governmental action, while conditioning
a governmental benefit is a responsive governmental action. An individ-
ual, however, should be protected against both unprovoked and respon-
sive restraints on her religious liberty. l 0 Hence, although Roy and
Madyun are different in many ways, 01 they are similar to the extent
that both involve governmental, not individual, action. Nevertheless, in
Madyun, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did provide
some free exercise protection to a male prisoner objecting to being
frisked by female guards.10" This result would be incompatible with the
distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in Roy.103
B. The Imposition of an Unworkable Standard
Despite the subtle distinctions between the Roy scenario and those
found in the cases just discussed, it is unlikely that these differences
translate into a realistic distinction between action that is solely under-
taken by the government and individual action. Nonetheless, because
the Roy Court failed specifically to overrule these lines of cases, the
standard articulated by Roy will surely be blurred. Courts will be able
to distinguish Roy so that the facts before the bench fit situations in
which free exercise protection traditionally had been afforded. Lawyers,
moreover, will be able to avoid Roy simply by pleading a secondary
effect on individual action. A new line of cases involving free exercise'
challenges to the development of sacred Indian lands provides the tem-
plate for this discussion.
'o See supra note 84; infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
101 Madyun is different from Roy in that frisk searches also implicate other rights,
such as the right to privacy, see Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 55 (7th Cir. 1982)
(holding that by instructing female guards to exclude the genital area in conducting a
frisk, the individual is afforded sufficient privacy rights), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907
(1983), unreasonable search, and cruel and unusual punishment. See Madyun, 704
F.2d at 956, 960-61. In Madyun, however, these claims were also dismissed. Id. For a
further discussion of these cases, see Note, Constitutional Limitation on Body Searches
in Prisons, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1033 (1982).
"02 See Madyun, 704 F.2d at 960.
'03 See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
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1. The Ambiguities Inherent in the Roy Standard: Precluding
Meaningful Guidance
There is language in Roy suggesting that the distinction between
governmental and individual action can be limited to internal, as op-
posed to external, governmental action: "The Free Exercise Clause af-
fords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental com-
pulsion; it does not afford the individual a right to dictate the conduct
of the Government's internal procedures."'" Faced with a free exer-
cise challenge by Northwest Indians to government plans approving
timber harvesting and road construction in a national forest, the Ninth
Circuit employed this very distinction to circumvent the application of
Roy.
0 5
Although timber harvesting and road construction may be entirely
external action, and using social security numbers solely in a govern-
ment computer system may be entirely internal action, few other ac-
tions are entirely internal or external. Would using an individual's so-
cial security number become external if the number was printed on
benefit checks? Should timber harvesting and road building be consid-
ered external even if it is conducted entirely on government-owned
land? Is photographing an applicant for a driver's license internal or
external? 06 What if the photographs were to be used solely in govern-
ment files rather than being affixed to the driver's license? Would the
use of a prisoner's committed name, rather than his religious name, by
prison guards solely within a prison be considered internal or external
governmental action ?107 No definition of "internal" is given either by
the Roy Court or by the Ninth Circuit. It would appear, therefore, that
courts could avoid the harsh results of the Roy standard and produce an
outcome to which they are predisposed by labeling governmental con-
duct internal rather than external.
Lawyers for plaintiffs challenging governmental actions will also
be able to circumvent the result of the Roy decision simply by pleading
some secondary effect on individual action. For instance, in Quaring v.
Peterson, the primary action at issue was that of the government taking
a photograph required for a valid driver's license."0 8 Should a similar
104 Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2152 (1986) (emphasis added).
"05 See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688,
693 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that logging and road building are "not the kind of inter-
nal government practice[s] that the Court found beyond free exercise attack in Roy.")
See also infra notes 134-35.
100 See supra notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
107 See, e.g., Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986).
108 See supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
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factual pattern presently arise, the plaintiff's attorney would be able to
assert a seemingly innocuous individual action, such as presence, to dis-
tinguish Roy, and then insist that such action is protected by virtue of
the Quaring decision."' 9
Even if Roy were to recur, an attorney would conceivably be able
to avoid the Roy precedent by pleading a collateral effect on individual
action. At trial, Roy testified that the utilization of Little Bird of the
Snow's social security number would rob her spirit and "prevent her
from attaining greater spiritual power."110 Being confronted with the
Roy precedent, an attorney would then ask about the effect the loss of
spiritual power would have on Little Bird of the Snow. Undoubtedly,
Roy could claim that some of her religious actions would be affected;
for example, he could claim she would be unable to perform or partici-
pate in certain rituals because of her spiritual impurity.111 In short,
whenever a governmental action impedes a religion, some secondary ef-
fect on individual action can always be found to avoid the Roy result.
2. Example of Unworkability: Indian Land Use Cases
Indian groups have claimed that governmental use and develop-
ment of certain public lands violate their religious freedoms.11 Adher-
ents to traditional Indian religions claim that development of certain
areas would result in the extinction of their religions because it would
109 Likewise, new cases challenging coerced medical treatment or the frisking of
prisoners may also be unaffected by Roy even though they involve primarily govern-
ment action. Plaintiffs will be able to distinguish Roy by pleading a secondary effect on
individual action and then relying on the pre-Roy cases for the proposition that these
types of intrusions should be afforded some protection. See supra notes 69-102 and
accompanying text.
110 Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2150.
" Similarly, assume that a primary governmental action destroys a religion as in
the majestic oak hypothetical. See supra text accompanying note 29. The members of
the religion, although not formally deterred from acting, will in the future be unable to
pray to their deity. Thus, they would be able to avoid the Roy precedent.
1I See, e.g., Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d
688 (9th Cir. 1985) (Northwest Indians objecting to timber harvesting and road con-
struction); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.) (Hopi and Navajo Indians ob-
jecting to proposed expansion of ski resort in San Francisco Peaks), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 956 (1983); New Mexico Navajo Ranchers Ass'n v. I.C.C., 702 F.2d 227 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (Navajo Indian's suit to block construction of a rail line on sacred Indian
sites); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir.) (Navajo Indian suit against water
storage project located on a Navajo reservation), cert. denied ub nom. Badoni v.
Broadbent, 452 U.S. 954 (1980); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159
(6th Cir.) (Cherokee Indian's challenge to the completion of the Tellico Dam and
flooding of sacred Cherokee land), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Crow v. Gullet,
541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982) (Lakota Nation and Tsistsistas Nation objecting to
construction of roads and parking area near ceremonial religious grounds), affld, 706
F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fools Crow v. Gullet, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
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"undermine the religious power of sacred rites, inhibit communications
with spirits, prevent the collection of healing herbs, and even kill tribal
deities.1 113 Application of traditional free exercise doctrine is especially
difficult in this area because many Indian religions do not adhere to the
Judeo-Christian concept of a supreme and immortal deity, a belief in
whom may be divorced from any specific site or mode of worship.
Rather, these Indian religions are site-specific: the place where an event
occurred, and not the event itself, has spiritual significance.11 4 Tradi-
tional free exercise 115 doctrine, by protecting practices rather than loca-
tions, fails to provide adequate protection for Indian religions. Thus,
although the development of a particular tract of land could devastate
an Indian religion, traditional free exercise doctrine might not provide
any protection.
Generally, courts have applied a three-part test in Indian land de-
velopment cases. First, the courts have required the Indians to prove
that the governmental action creates a burden on their religion.1 Sec-
ond, the courts have required the Indians to show that the "area at
issue is indispensable and central to their religious practices and beliefs,
and that the proposed governmental actions would seriously interfere
with or impair those religious practices."11 " Third, the courts have ap-
118 Note, supra note 35, at 1448. See, e.g., Northwest, 795 F.2d at 692; Wilson,
708 F.2d at 740; Badoni, 638 F.2d at 177.
114 See Note, supra note 35, at 1448-49 ("location is essential to many aspects of
Indian ritual and belief"). See also Note, Indian Worship v. Government: A New
Breed of Religion Cases, 1984 UTAH L. REv. 313, 319-20 ("The basic difference be-
tween world and Indian religions has been defined as the difference between perceiving
the world in a spatial or linear manner .... To Indians, communal involvement in
ceremonies and continual renewal of relationships with holy places are more important
than the efforts to conform individual behavior to religious dogma, a characteristic of
the major world religions." (footnotes omitted)).
115 The distinction in Roy between individual and governmental action exemplifies
the bias against site-specific religions. By not providing protection unless an individual
action is required or prevented, the Roy standard would fail to protect against a govern-
mental action that could destroy a site that is indispensable to an Indian religion. For
example, in the majestic oak example, supra text accompanying note 29, the Roy stan-
dard would fail to provide any protection to religion Y because destroying the tree
would involve action only by the government, but not by any individuals.
11I See, e.g., Northwest, 795 F.2d at 691; Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740; Badoni, 638
F.2d at 176; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1163.
117 Northwest, 795 F.2d at 692. See, e.g., Wilson, 708 F.2d at 742-44; Badoni,
638 F.2d at 176-77; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164; Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 792. Although
the courts have required a showing of "centrality" in Indian land cases, such a showing
has not been required in traditional Free Exercise cases. See Note, Constitutional Law:
Religious Freedom and Public Land Use, 20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 109, 116-17
(1985); Note, supra note 114, at 323-24. This added burden on Indians claiming in-
fringements of their religious liberty goes directly against the Congressional policy of
providing special protection to Indian religious claims. See generally, The American
Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982). For a general discus-
sion of the A.I.R.F., see Note, supra note 35, at 1457-59.
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plied a balancing test, searching for a compelling government inter-
est."' These claims have generally failed either because the Indians
have not shown a sufficient burden on religion"' or because there was
a sufficiently compelling state interest involved.120 For example, in Wil-
son v. Block,121 the Navajo and Hopi tribes attempted to block a plan
for further development of the San Francisco Peaks.1 22 The Peaks are
within a National Forest and are managed by the Forest Service.1 23 A
777-acre section of the Peaks known as the "Snow Bowl" had been
used for downhill skiing since 1937.124 In 1979, the Forest Service de-
cided to allow further development of the Snow Bowl by private inves-
tors.1 25 Both the Navajos and the Hopis believe that the expanded use
of the Peaks would directly burden their religions. The Wilson court
noted:
Believing the San Francisco Peaks to be sacred, [the Navajo
and Hopi Indians] feel that development of the Peaks would
be a profane act, and an affront to the deities, and that, in
consequence, the Peaks would lose their healing power and
otherwise cease to benefit the tribes.
• ..The Hopis and the Navajos believe that they owe
a duty to the deities to maintain the San Francisco Peaks in
their natural state. They believe that breach of that duty will
lead to serious adverse consequences for their peoples.
12 1
11 See, e.g., Northwest, 795 F.2d at 694; Wilson, 708 F.2d at 742-44; Badoni,
638 F.2d at 176-77; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1163-64; Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 790-91.
119 See, e.g., Wilson, 708 F.2d at 744-45; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164.
120 See, e.g., Badoni, 638 F.2d at 178-79; Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 794.
121 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert.denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983). For a general
discussion of Wilson, see Note, Constitutional Law: Religious Freedom and Public
Land Use, supra note 119.
122 Wilson, 708 F.2d at 738-39.
12 Id. at 738. The fact that the land is owned by the government and that the
Indians have no property right in the land is not dispositive. The government must
manage its property in a manner that does not offend the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Badoni, 638 F.2d at 176; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164.
124 Wilson, 708 F.2d at 738.
125 Id. at 738-39.
128 Id. at 740. Specifically, the Navajos believed that the Peaks are one of the four
sacred mountains that form the boundaries of their homeland. Id. at 738. Not only do
they believe the Peaks to be the home of specific deities, but they consider them "the
body of a spiritual being or god, with various peaks forming the head, shoulders, and
knees of a body reclining and facing to the east, while the trees, plants, rocks, and earth
form the skin." Id. In essence, the Navajos regard the Peaks as a living deity, pray
directly to them as such, and believe that their development would impair the Peaks'
healing power. Id. The Hopis believe that for six months each year, the Kachinas,
"emissaries" from the creator, reside in the peaks. The Kachinas' activities on the
Peaks create the rain and snow storms that support the Hopis' villages. Id. "The Hopis
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Thus, the development of the Peaks would seriously damage the Nav-
ajo and Hopi religions. Furthermore, testimony by the Chairman of the
Hopi Tribe suggested that in the long run the expansion could even
lead to the extinction of the Hopi religion and culture."'
The Wilson court ruled, however, that the development would not
burden the Indians' religious beliefs or practices. 2 The court held that
"plaintiffs seeking to restrict government land use in the name of reli-
gious freedom must, at a minimum, demonstrate that the government's
proposed land use would impair a religious practice that could not be
performed at any other site.""2 9 The court reasoned that because reli-
gious practices could occur in many other locations, the Hopi and Nav-
ajo Indians could practice their religions at other sites.' 30 This finding
precluded the court from conducting a balancing test before it ruled
against the Indians. "' This ruling represents a fundamental misunder-
standing of Indian religions, which emphasize the importance of the
place where events occurred, rather than the events themselves.'3" The
ability to pray, collect herbs, and conduct ceremonies at other sites does
not satisfy the Indians' duties to conduct these practices at a specific
site. "' In a sense, therefore, whether or not individual action has been
prevented was a threshold question for Indians challenging the develop-
ment of land even before Roy. That standard has been difficult, if not
impossible, to meet.
Nevertheless, in Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Associa-
tion v. Peterson,34 a case decided after Roy, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed this trend. The case provides an ideal exam-
ple of a court distinguishing Roy by focusing on the secondary effects
believe that the use of the Peaks for commercial purposes would constitute a direct
affront to the Kachinas and to the Creator." Id.
127 Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740 n.2. See also id. "'It is my opinion that in the long
run if the expansion is permitted, we will not be able successfully to teach our people
that this is a sacred place. If the ski resort remains or is expanded, our people will not
accept the view that this is the sacred Home of the Kachinas. The basis of our existence
as a society will become a mere fairy tale to our people. If our people no longer possess
this long-held belief and way of life, which will inevitably occur with the continued
presence of the ski resort'... 'a direct and negative impact upon our religious prac-
tices [will result]. The destruction of these practices will also destroy our present way of
life and culture."' (quoting Abbott Sekaquaptewa, former chairman of the Hopi tribe).
128 Id. at 745.
129 Id. at 744.
130 Id.
11 Id. at 745. The court found no need to decide whether the ski area expansion
was a compelling government interest because the plaintiffs had not shown that devel-
opment would burden their religious beliefs or practice. Id.
182 See Note, supra note 114, at 320.
1I Wilson, 708 F.2d at 744.
134 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986).
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on individual action rather than on the primary governmental action.
The court here found that government plans to permit timber harvest-
ing and road construction in a national forest burdened the religion of
the Northwest Indians; moreover, no sufficiently compelling state inter-
est justified this interference." 5 The court stressed the ancillary effects
on individual action: "Communication with the 'great creator' is possi-
ble in the high country because of the pristine environment and oppor-
tunity for solitude found there. . . . [T]he harvesting of timber in the
high country, including 'clear cutting,' would seriously damage the sali-
ent visual, aural, and environmental qualities of the high country."'3 6
Continuing with this rationale, the court held in favor of the plaintiffs:
"[M]uch of the adverse impact would be indirect, [due to] . . . in-
creased uses made possible by the Road . . . . [N]oise levels from the
proposed Road would interfere with religious uses of the high country
• . . [thus] demonstrat[ing] that the Road would interfere with the free
exercise of their religion."'" 7
Thus, despite the fact that the court had already instituted a
threshold question, to which Roy gave added validity, and that the gov-
ernment's action had only a tangential effect on individual action, the
court nonetheless marshalled the plaintiffs' cause.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION: A THIRD CATEGORY OF FREE EXERCISE
PROTECTION
The standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Roy
can be interpreted either as a curtailment of free exercise protection or
as the imposition of a standard providing no guidance to the courts.
The result is that in some cases free exercise protection will not be
accorded in areas in which it has traditionally been applied, while in
other cases protection will be accorded irrespective of Roy. Even more
egregious is the fact that this confusion results from a standard that
affronts the purpose underlying the free exercise clause,'3 8 results in an
arbitrary distinction among plaintiffs,' 39 and responds to the Court's
driving concerns in a manner so overbroad that it undermines those
135 Id. at 695.
136 Id. at 692 (citing Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565
F. Supp. 586, 594-95 (N.D. Cal. 1983)).
"I Northwest, 795 F.2d at 693. For additional examples of the effect of govern-
mental action on individual action, see Bandoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176
(1980) (performing religious ceremonies); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620
F.2d 1159, 1160 (1980) (collecting medicines); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 788
(1982) (site of pilgrimages and ceremonies).
138 See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
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concerns.1 40 In effect, a third type of free exercise protection is war-
ranted: protection against government action that impairs an individ-
ual's ability to choose or follow her religion freely even when no indi-
vidual action is required or prevented.
Currently, the Supreme Court recognizes two categories of free
exercise protection: 141 the freedom of an individual to believe, which is
absolute, and the freedom of an individual to act in accordance with her
beliefs, which is protected unless there is a compelling state interest
justifying infringement. A standard providing protection against purely
governmental actions that infringe on the ability of individuals to
choose or follow a specific religion freely1 42 both comports with the
purposes behind the free exercise clause and is narrowly tailored to
address the concerns voiced by the Roy Court. This standard neither
requires the government to join in an individual's religion nor to justify
every one of its actions. Moreover, the standard permits courts to take
notice of the severity of the deprivation to the plaintiff.
A. Governmental Actions Aimed at Specific Individuals
If the governmental action is aimed at a specific individual, that
individual's ability to choose or follow a religion will always be ob-
structed. This is true whether the individual-specific governmental ac-
tion is unprovoked, as in the case of frisk searches or forced medical
treatment, or responsive, as in the case of social security number or
photograph requirements for public benefits. Unprovoked individual-
specific governmental action threatens to violate the individual's con-
science with a direct infringement. On the other hand, responsive gov-
ernmental action compels the individual to choose between the dictates
of her faith and abandoning a government benefit to which she is other-
wise entitled and probably needs. In short, the government either en-
gages in torture or extortion, in either case interefering with the indi-
vidual's ability to choose or follow her religion. Because the free
exercise clause was intended to proscribe such interference, courts gen-
erally should extend protection. 4
Moreover, individuals challenging governmental action in these
cases simply seek a religious exemption, not a total cessation of the
practice. Roy, for example, sought not to eradicate the social security
40 See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
142 The ability of an individual to choose and follow a religion free from govern-
mental interference is a major purpose of the religion clauses. See supra notes 35-46
and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
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number requirement for welfare recipients but only to exclude his
daughter from the requirement; similarly, individuals asserting reli-
gious objections to photograph or frisking requirements desire only to
exempt themselves from the practices, not to end them completely. Con-
sequently, the argument that permitting these claims would choke gov-
ernment operations loses validity.
Finally, individuals objecting to unprovoked governmental actions
may view these actions just as seriously as an infringement of their
right to pray.'44 Certainly, the consequences may be equally damaging.
Likewise, while responsive governmental actions associated with gov-
ernment benefits create only an indirect burden on religion, 45 they can
actually create a heavier burden when in fact the benefit is a matter of
necessity. While the individual can take refuge in the knowledge that
unprovoked government action is undertaken without her consent, in
the case of responsive governmental action the individual is implicated
in the religious violation because it was at her instigation (by applying
for the benefit) that the governmental action was taken. In any event
these violations are equally objectionable because the Supreme Court
has consistently held that "a person may not be compelled to choose
between the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in
an otherwise available public program.M
46
The same burden on religion is created whether the state condi-
tions a benefit on a governmental or an individual action. In both cases,
the individual is forced to choose between the tenets of her religion and
the governmental benefit. Thus, in both cases, the individual should be
given free exercise protection.
144 See supra notes 69, 98 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 7-21, 50-68 and accompanying text (discussing the social se-
curity number requirement for welfare benefits and the photograph requirement for
drivers' licenses, respectively).
148 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716
(1981). See also Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2169 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part)("The fact that appellees seek exemption from a
precondition that the Government attaches to an award of benefits does not, therefore,
generate a meaningful distinction between this case and one where appellees seek an
exemption from the Government's imposition of penalties upon them."); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) ("It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties
of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions
upon a benefit or privilege."); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (hold-
ing that a state may not "exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans,
Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-Believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other
faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation").
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B. General Governmental Actions
Religious objections to general actions by the government that are
not aimed at a specific individual should only be recognized when the
action would impede the ability of individuals to freely choose or follow
a religion.14 This impediment to choice would surely occur if the gov-
ernment acted in a way which destroyed or severely handicapped a reli-
gion. An individual, however, should not be able to stop the govern-
ment from acting simply because, based on her religion, she could not
act in that manner herself.14
1. Developing the Appropriate Test
If protection were provided whenever there was a conflict between
a governmental action and any religion, then the government would be
forced to justify almost every one of its actions. When a governmental
action is aimed at the specific individual, only that individual should be
able to bring a religious objection. 4 On the other hand, when the gov-
ernment acts in a general manner, the range of potential conflicts is
dramatically increased. In fact, few, if any, governmental activities oc-
cur to which some person or group might not object on religious
grounds.1 50 As the Roy court noted, "virtually every action that the
Government takes, no matter how innocuous it might appear, is poten-
tially susceptible to a Free Exercise objection." '
This concern over the government's ability to operate, however,
should not bar recovery in all cases of general governmental actions. It
is obviated by the requirement that individuals initially demonstrate
that the governmental action actually impedes their ability to choose or
follow a religion. Conflict between their religion and governmental ac-
tion is not necessarily sufficient. Plaintiffs would meet this threshold
inquiry only when a governmental action would destroy or handicap
their religion.
1 52
147 See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
4 For example, consider the situation where an individual objects to government
offices being open on Saturdays. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
149 Cf Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("For the Free Exer-
cise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual
150 See Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586, 589 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1036 (1970) (individuals seeking refunds of federal income taxes used to fight the
war in Viet Nam).
'6 Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2156 n.17.
1 This Comment is primarily concerned with the preliminary question of when
there should be Free Exercise protection; it is not concerned with what degree of pro-
tection should be provided (the workings of the balancing test). Nevertheless, a short
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In the majestic oak example,153 this part of the test would be met
because if the tree were cut down, tribe members would be unable to
pray to the tree. Thus, the religion would be destroyed. Consequently,
present members would be unable to follow their faith and prospective
members would be unable to choose that religion.
Destruction of the religion, however, should not be a prerequisite
for free exercise protection. It is not the exclusive indicator of an action
that obstructs an individual's ability to choose or follow her religion.
For example, assume that a religion exists whose followers believe that
certain mountains are living deities and pray to them accordingly. One
mountain is in California and the other in Pennsylvania. If the govern-
ment decided to build a military base on the mountain in Pennsylvania,
followers of the religion would undoubtedly object because of their be-
lief that development would destroy the spiritual powers of the moun-
tain. The governmental action would not destroy the religion; rather,
members of the religion could pray to the other mountain. However,
this would require that they move to California. Forcing the members
of a religion to choose between abandoning their religion or moving
across the country undoubtedly impedes their ability to follow their re-
ligion. Thus, members of the religion should be protected. However,
this religious interest should be balanced against the interests of the
government and other citizens in building the military base on that par-
ticular mountain.
discussion of the factors to be included in the balancing test for general governmental
actions is provided below.
In the case of general governmental actions, the interests of other citizens in utiliz-
ing the benefits of general governmental actions, as well as the state's interest in the
action, must be considered in the balancing test. For example, in Wilson v. Block, 708
F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983), other citizens had an interest
in utilizing the benefits of the proposed ski resort. If the resort was not expanded be-
cause of the religious objections of the Hopi and Navajo Indians, then the other citizens
would be harmed. One way that this interest could be considered would be by reducing
the degree of protection provided in the balancing test.
This interest, however, does not apply to all general governmental actions. For
example, reconsider the situation where government plans to build a road would re-
quire that a majestic oak, symbolic to followers of religion Y, be cut down. See supra
note 29 and preceding text. Other citizens undoubtedly have an interest in using the
proposed road. However, if the government accommodated religion Y and moved the
road to the east, other citizens would not be harmed. Thus, other citizens have an
interest in using the road, but do not have an interest in having the road built in that
specific location. The interests of other citizens in a governmental action should be
considered only when the religious objection would prevent the entire project; their
interests are not implicated when the government can accommodate the religious indi-
viduals and still proceed with the project.
13 See supra note 29 and preceding text.
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2. Application to the Development of Sacred Indian Lands
Under the standard proposed in this section, an individual (or a
group of individuals) could only object to the development of public
land by the government if that development would impede the ability of
individuals to freely choose or follow a religion.' In Wilson v.
Block,155 the Navajo and Hopi Indians believed that the further devel-
opment and expansion of a ski resort on the San Francisco peaks would
lead to serious consequences for their religions and seriously impair the
ability of the religion to successfully teach their people that the peaks
are a sacred place."5 ' In essence, the governmental action could lead to
the extinction of the religions. The standard proposed in this section
would protect the followers from such a result.1 57
The second part of the test would be to balance the individuals'
religious interests against the interests of the state and of other citizens.
In Wilson, the court did not examine the state interest involved because
it found no burden on religion was present.1 "' The government has a
statutory interest in administering national forests for multiple uses.159
The statute instructs the United States Forest Service to consider the
relative values of resources and not necessarily to emphasize the combi-
nations of uses that would give the greatest dollar return. 60 The value
154 This standard would apply even if no action by the individuals is involved. In
actuality, most of the cases involve governmental actions that also restrict actions by the
individuals. See supra note 137. However, this Comment is concerned especially with
the situation when the only action involved is that of the government. The case that is
most similar factually is Wilson, 708 F.2d 735. There, the Indians claimed that the
development alone, independent of the restrictions on their actions, would severely im-
pede their religions, leading them to possible extinction. Id. at 739-740.
155 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
15 Id. at 740.
157 A governmental action which handicaps and potentially destroys a religion un-
doubtedly violates the religion clauses. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982)
("The state may not adopt programs or practices . . . which 'aid or oppose' any reli-
gion. . . .This prohibition is absolute." (citing Epperson v. Arkansas 393 U.S. 97,
106 (1968))); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963) (" 'The
government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages
none'." (citing Minor v. Board of Educ., Sup. Ct. of Cincinnati (Feb. 1870)
(unpublished))).
15I Wilson, 708 F.2d at 745.
155 16 U.S.C. § 529 (1982) ("The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized and di-
rected to develop and administer the renewable surface resources of the national forests
for multiple use and sustained yield of the several products and services obtained there-
from."). See generally Note, Constitutional Law: Religious Freedom and Public Land
Use, supra note 117, at 118 (discussing the interests involved and concluding that the
expansion does not serve a compelling state interest).
160 16 U.S.C. § 531(a) (1982) (" 'Multiple use' means: The management of all
the various renewable surface resources of the national forests so that they are utilized
in the combination that will best meet the needs of the American people ...with
consideration being given to the relative values of the various resources, and not neces-
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of the Peaks to the Navajo and Hopi Indian religions is one of the
elements that should be considered. Furthermore, the establishment and
maintenance of areas of wilderness is consistent with the purposes and
provisions of the statute."' 1 Prior to the expansion of the ski resort, the
Peaks accommodated both citizens interested in skiing and the Indians'
religion. If the ski resort were expanded, one of the multiple uses of the
Peaks would be destroyed: the religious use by the Indians." 2 Thus the
state interest in expanding the ski resort is very small.
Other citizens also have an interest in expanding the ski resort.
Specifically, these citizens have an interest in using the mountain for
skiing. However, these citizens could undoubtedly ski on other moun-
tains. The skiers would argue that the Indians could conduct their reli-
gious practices on other mountains. But, because the Indian religions
are site-specific, 63 this would not be possible. Hence, the Indian's reli-
gious interest, in this case, outweighs the interest of the state and of
other citizens in expanding the ski resort.
CONCLUSION
The two religion clauses of the first amendment together stand for
the proposition that an individual should be free to choose or follow a
religion without any invasions by the government."" State interference
in religion, whether positive or negative, must be prohibited. 65 How-
ever, the standard developed in Roy only provides religious protection
when individuals are prevented from acting in accordance with their
religion (or coerced into acting against it). Nevertheless, situations arise
when action by the government that neither requires nor prevents any
action by the individual can substantially burden an individual's reli-
gion. This can occur when the government acts directly against an indi-
vidual, threatens to act in a certain manner if the individual applies for
a governmental benefit, or acts in a general manner that would destroy
or severely handicap a religion. The prohibition of interference by the
sarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest
unit output.").
161 See 16 U.S.C. § 529 (1982) ("The establishment and maintenance of areas of
wilderness are consistent with the purposes and provisions of sections 528 to 531 of this
title.").
162 In Wilson, the Indians' religious use is accomplished by maintaining the Peaks
in their natural state. See Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740. This is consistent with the statutory
governmental interest which allows the maintenance of areas for wilderness. See supra
note 161 and accompanying text.
163 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 40, 44 and accompanying text.
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government must apply to these situations as well as when individuals
are required to or prevented from acting in accordance with their
religions.
To followers of orthodox religions, many of the religious practices
and claims in this Comment may seem unusual and trivial; the en-
croachments on the first amendment may seem minor. Still, to members
of these religions the burdens are very real. The government must pro-
tect both unusual and orthodox religions.1 6 6 As the Court stated in
Schempp,167 "[t]he breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream
may all too soon become a raging torrent .... .""' Religious liberty is
one of our most sacred liberties.1 69 If it is sacrificed, all other civil
rights are at risk. "[lit is proper to take alarm at the first experiment
on our liberties," ' as James Madison once warned.
18 See supra note 41-43 and accompanying text.
167 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
188 Id. at 225.
189 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring in result) ("I am convinced that no liberty is more essential to the continued vital-
ity of the free society which our Constitution guarantees than is the religious liberty
protected by the Free Exercise Clause. . . ."); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 26
(1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting that the freedom of religion "was first in the
Bill of Rights because it was first in the forefathers' minds").
170 J. MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religions Assessments, in
2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 185 (G. Hunt ed. 1901).
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